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Abstract
This paper presents an algorithm for detecting spoofing attacks
against automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems. While
such systems now have performances comparable to those of
other biometric modalities, spoofing techniques used against
them have progressed drastically. Several techniques can be
used to generate spoofing materials (e.g., speech synthesis and
voice conversion techniques), and detecting them only on the
basis of differences at an acoustic speaker modeling level is a
challenging task. Moreover, differences between “live” and ar-
tificially generated material are expected to gradually decrease
in the near future due to advances in synthesis technologies.
A previously proposed “voice liveness” detection framework
aimed at validating whether speech signals were generated by
a person or artificially created uses elementary algorithms to
detect pop noise. Detection is taken as evidence of liveness.
A more advanced detection algorithm has now been developed
that combines single- and double-channel pop noise detection.
Experiments demonstrated that this tandem algorithm detects
pop noise more effectively: the detection error rate was up to
80% less that those achieved with the elementary algorithms.
1. Introduction
Biometric authentication plays an important role in reliable
management systems [1, 2]. Automatic speaker verification
(ASV) is an easy-to-use biometric authentication system that
uses only speaker’s voice samples. Its performance has been
improved by making use of techniques based on i-vectors [3] or
probabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) [4]. More-
over, the current performance of state-of-the-art ASV schemes
makes them ready for mass-market adoption.
At the same time, there has been significant progress in
speech synthesis technologies such as text-to-speech (TTS)
systems [5, 6] and voice transformation or conversion sys-
tems [7]. Such system can now generate natural-sounding ar-
tificial speech for a target speaker from text or the waveform of
speech uttered by someone else. Although there has been much
research on these technologies for use in various applications
(e.g., for assisting individuals with vocal disabilities), they can
also be used for vocal identity falsification such as in spoofing
attacks against ASV systems, representing a serious personal
security issue [8, 9, 10]. This has led to the recent emergence of
research on the definition and development of countermeasures
for detecting spoofing attacks [11, 12, 13, 14]. Typically, three
different types of these attacks are considered: replay, speech
synthesis, and voice conversion. The countermeasure strategies
are mainly based on comparing the acoustic features of artificial
signals with those of natural ones [15, 16, 17], with spectral, F0,
and modulation-related information used as the basis of their
computation [18]. However, the acoustic differences between
artificial and natural speech are expected to gradually become
smaller and eventually negligible in the near future.
Looking at other biometrics fields, we see that face, finger-
print, and even iris recognition systems also suffer from spoof-
ing attacks, and researchers are continuing to develop appro-
priate countermeasures [19, 20, 21]. One of the most effective
countermeasures is to use a “liveness detection” framework to
determine whether the attempted authentication is from an ac-
tual person (live voice). The liveness detection framework has
been reported to reduced vulnerability significantly in various
image processing fields [22, 23, 24].
To determine whether the presented signals originated from
an actual person, their liveness needs to be evaluated. One way
to do this is to detect pop noise, and several algorithms for de-
tecting it have been reported [25]. Since pop noise is a com-
mon distortion in speech that occurs when a speaker’s breath
reaches the microphone and is poorly reproduced by loudspeak-
ers [26, 27], it seems reasonable to consider it as evidence of
liveness at the input of an authentication system. A measure
that takes into account the presence of pop noise phenomena
might therefore be well suited as the basis for discriminating
between live and played speech (though loudspeakers).
We previously proposed a strategy for ASV based on
the “liveness detection” framework and defined techniques for
countermeasures based on voice liveness detection (VLD) with
the aim of detecting spoofing materials more robustly [25].
These countermeasures include pop noise detection algorithms.
More precisely, two algorithms based on two different strate-
gies were presented. Testing showed that each has promising
detection performance. To achieve even better performance, we
have now integrated them into a tandem algorithm. Experimen-
tal evaluation on ASV tasks showed that tandem approach does
improve performance (equal error rate from 4.73% to 0.95%).
In section 2 we briefly describe voice liveness detection.
Our proposed tandem pop noise detector is presented in sec-
tion 3. Section 4 presents the evaluation results, and section 5
summarizes the key points and mentions future work.
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Figure 1: Overview of automatic speaker verification system
including VLD module
2. Voice liveness detection
2.1. Attacks on speaker verification systems
The potential for ASV to be spoofed is well recognized and
there is growing interest in assessing the vulnerabilities of ASV
systems and developing robust countermeasures against spoof-
ing attacks [8, 9]. There are three main types of spoofing at-
tacks: replay, speech synthesis, and voice conversion. Each type
of attack is defined as follows:
• Replay: replay of pre-recorded utterances of the target
person.
• Speech synthesis: automatic generation of natural-
sounding artificial speech for a target person from text.
• Voice conversion: conversion of attacker’s natural voice
into that of targeted person.
Several countermeasures against each type of spoofing attack
have been reported. For replay attacks, we can simply use
text prompting and change the prompts every time [28, 29].
However, for spoofing attacks based on material generated by
means of speech synthesis and voice conversion techniques,
none of the reported countermeasures provide a fundamental
solution [30]. Considering the actual potential scenarios for
spoofing attacks, we can assume that they are based on replay-
ing the spoofing material, through loudspeakers. Accordingly,
independently of the nature of the spoofing material, our task is
to basically discriminate between speech produced by an actual
person and speech played through loudspeakers.
2.2. Framework of voice liveness detection
Figure 1 shows a diagram of an automatic speaker verification
system including the VLD module. The VLD module is de-
signed to reject all speech signals that do not show evidence of
liveness regardless of the nature of the spoofing attack. Speaker
verification is conducted as usual in a subsequent module. Al-
though this figure illustrates a sequential combination of VLD
and ASV modules, the VLD and ASV tasks can be integrated
to work simultaneously.
As liveness evidence the, VLD detects speech waveforms
characteristics unique to speech produced by an actual person.
Briefly, the human voice is the result of acoustic shaping in the
vocal tract of the airflow produced by interactions between the
lungs and vocal chords. The resulting airflow is transformed
into an acoustical signal when it is captured by a microphone.
Spontaneous strong breathing can cause convolution between
Hello
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Figure 2: Recording process in double-channel algorithm
the airflow and vocal cavities, producing a sort of perceived
plosive burst, commonly known as pop noise, which can be cap-
tured by a microphone. The acoustic conditions change when
this noise is played through loudspeakers, commonly resulting
in poor reproduction of the pop noise. Thus, by detecting pop
noise events, we may be able to distinguish between an actual
human voice and played back through loudspeakers.
3. TANDEM SINGLE-DOUBLE
CHANNEL POP NOISE DETECTOR
Here we first describe the concept and process of our two previ-
ously reported algorithms [25] for capturing pop noise as live-
ness evidence and then introduce our tandem algorithm.
3.1. Single- and double-channel pop noise detection algo-
rithms
The single-channel algorithm is focused on low-frequency en-
ergy since strong energy regions at very low frequencies are
commonly observed in speech waveforms in the presence of
pop noise. Following, the evolution of the long-term low-
frequency is evaluated in order to detect the presence of pop
noise. Although this algorithm showed promising performance
for different speakers and microphone conditions, its perfor-
mance was degraded when the input signal came from loud-
speakers.
The double-channel algorithm detects pop noise by using
a procedure for subtraction between two channels. The setup
requires two microphones, one with a pop noise filter and one
without, as shown in Figure 2. Let Fx(b, w) and Fp(b, w) be
the short-time Fourier transforms (STFT) of the filtered speech
and non-filtered speech respectively, where b and w denote
the frame index and frequency. Under the assumption that
only Fp(b, w) includes pop noise, a differential waveform is
estimated by subtracting the ordinary speech component from
Fp(b, w) by using Fx(b, w);
D(b, ω) = Fp(b, ω)− C(ω)Fx(b, ω), (1)
where C(ω) represents a compensation filter for compensating
between the frequency characteristics of the two channels. An
estimate ofC(ω) used to minimize
∑
b,ω |D(b, ω)|2 can be rep-
resented as
C(ω) =
∑
b Fp(b, w)Fx(b, w)
∗∑
b |Fx(b, w)|2
, (2)
where ∗ denotes complex conjugate. The inverse STFT of the
subtracted signalD(b, ω) is assumed to contain information re-
lated to pop noise rather than channel conditions or background
noise. More precisely, an amplitude-based decision is taken to
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Figure 3: Flow of tandem single-double channel pop noise de-
tection algorithm
characterize the presence of pop noise. Although its perfor-
mance was not better on average than that of the single-channel
algorithm, the double-channel algorithm performed better for
different signal conditions without being significantly affected
by other sources of noise.
3.2. Tandem single-double channel pop noise detection al-
gorithm
Since the single- and double-channel algorithms both exhibited
different benefits and drawbacks, we saw an advantage to in-
tegrating them into a single detector to better distinguish an
actual human voice from a spoofing attack. We thus created
a tandem single-double channel detection algorithm, as shown
in Fig. 3. The input waveform is first processed using double-
channel subtraction. The subtracted signal is then processed
using single-channel detection. This strategy should result in
better detection of irregular modulations in the subtracted sig-
nal than in the original waveform. Such modulations indicate
the presence of pop noise. As a result, detection performance
should be better than with the two individual algorithms.
4. Experiments
4.1. Database
Since the proposed framework focuses on speech signals that
include pop noise, a database of speech signals including in-
stances of this phenomenon is required. The NIST Speaker
Recognition Evaluation (SRE) database [31] is widely used
as material for evaluating ASV systems. However, it is not
appropriate for our purposes since it provides conversational
telephone speech with limited content of pop noise signals.
Therefore, we created a new database containing pop noise sig-
nals [25]. To evaluate performance, we used three types of mi-
crophones:
Voice Microphone with a voice recorder (SONY ECM-DM5P)
Camcorder Compatible microphone with camcorder (SONY
ECM-XYST1M)
Headset Microphone with a headset (SHURE SM10A-CN)
Two microphones of each type were used (one with a pop filter),
creating a configuration of six microphones channels.
We recorded a 17 female speakers (in Japanese). Each
speaker read out 100 sentences in total. Half of the sentences
were common to all the speakers and the other half were ran-
domly selected from Japanese Newspaper Article Sentences
(JNAS) [32] with a set of randomly selected sentences for each
speaker. The 50 common sentences were chosen on the basis
Table 1: Equal error rates of VLD algorithms
Microphone Camcorder Voice Headset
Single ch. 4.73% 36.06% 3.95%
Double ch. 29.11% 45.52% 5.88%
Tandem 0.95% 26.61% 2.35%
of phonetic coverage. We also pre-selected relatively short sen-
tences from the JNAS corpus before the random selection of the
rest of the remaining 50 sentences.
4.2. Experimental conditions
We used 30 randomly selected utterances for each microphone
without the pop filter for each speaker as live samples of test
data. The spoofing materials were constructed on the basis of
the statistical parametric speech synthesis framework described
by [5]. The speaker adaptation techniques in this framework
enable the generation of a synthetic voice using as little as a
few minutes of recorded speech from the target speaker [33].
The speaker adaptation algorithm used was structural varia-
tional Bayesian linear regression [34]. We used 50 common
sentences recorded with the headset microphone with the pop
filter to mimic the speaker adaptation of speech synthesis sys-
tems (because a pop filter is always used for normal recordings
of speech synthesis data). Using the speech synthesizers of in-
dividual target speakers, we synthesized artificial speech signals
for spoofing. The texts used for speech synthesis were the ran-
domly selected utterances of each speaker. The spoofing mate-
rials were then played through a loudspeaker (BOSE 111AD).
For the ASV system, we used the standard GMM-UBM-based
speaker verification method [35], and the speaker-dependent
models of individual speakers in the ASV system were con-
structed using the 50 common and 20 randomly selected sen-
tences of each speaker recorded with the headset microphone
with a pop filter. Here we focus on the effectiveness of the VLD
module and not on using a state-of-the-art ASV system. The
number of mixtures was set to 2048, and the UBM was trained
using about 23,000 utterances from the JNAS database [32],
which is the standard speech database for automatic speech and
speaker recognition in Japan. For the STFT analysis, the Ham-
ming window was selected as the window function; the window
width and the window shift were set to 4096 and 2048 points.
4.3. Experimental results
Table 1 shows the equal error rate (EER) of each VLD algorithm
for the three kinds of microphones. When the false positive rate
(the percentage of misclassified live voice events) is equal to
false negative rate (percentage of misclassified artificial voice
events), the common values is the EER. Note that the distance
between the speaker’s mouth and the microphone varied with
the kind of microphone. With conventional methods, the head-
set microphone generally performs better than camcorder and
voice recorder microphones because the mouth is closer to the
microphone. With our tandem algorithm, the camcorder micro-
phone resulted in the lowest EER, and the tandem algorithm had
the best performance under all microphone conditions. Com-
parison of the tandem algorithm with the single-channel algo-
rithm show that the EER with the camcorder was reduced from
4.73% to 0.95%. Since the camcorder is the most sensitive mi-
crophone with the best noise suppression, noises with a differ-
261
Figure 4: Equal error rates for ASV including spoofing attacks
(SA)
ent nature may be captured with the single-channel algorithm.
In contrast, the tandem algorithm appears to be able to substract
some of the common noises denoting the camcorder recordings
as the one showing best conditions for pop noise detection.
Figure 4 illustrates the EERs for ASV, including spoofing
attacks. The ”VLD” denotes the integration of a VLD module
into the ASV system. Three different VLD implementations are
compared. As expected, spoofing attacks degraded with ASV
performance. Since the spoofing attacks were made by enroll-
ment speech recorded with a headset microphone, they were
weaker with the voice microphone. The EERs with the headset
and camcorder microphones were greatly affected by the pres-
ence of spoofing attacks. Moreover, the EERs values for all
VLD+ASV cases, clearly reduced the vulnerability of the ASV
system. Thses results demonstrate the potential of the proposed
framework as an anti-spoofing countermeasure based on voice
liveness detection.
4.4. Analysis of effectiveness against replay attack
In the experiment described above, the spoofing attack was Hid-
den Markov model (HMM)-based speech synthesis for a text-
independent ASV system. However, a text-dependent ASV
system may also suffer replay attacks. In this case, when pop
noise is present in a recordings made by an impostor as enroll-
ment material, it may also appear on the spoofing attacks. As
shown by the two top-right waveforms in Fig 5 with the single-
channel algorithm, pop noise replayed through a loudspeaker
could sometimes be detected while it disappeared in the sub-
tracted waveform with the double-channel algorithm (bottom-
right waveform). This implies that the tandem algorithm is ef-
fective for both text-dependent and text-independent ASV sys-
tems and is thus an effective solution.
5. Conclusion
Identification of ”liveness” information in the input speech
is needed to protect against spoofing attacks on ASV sys-
tems. Two algorithms based on single- and double-channel
approaches for capturing this information in terms of the de-
tection of pop noise were previously presented. The tandem
single-double channel algorithm presented here improves de-
tection performance. It detects pop noise more accurately and
thus improves the discrimination of live voice signals and ar-
tificial ones. With this approach, the voice liveness detection
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Figure 5: Comparison of waveforms with pop noise before (left)
and after replay (right). The two top ones on each side corre-
spond to the two filters shown in Fig 2; the bottom ones are the
result of subtraction using the double-channel algorithm.
performance was significantly improved. Future work includes
conducting trials using a larger database and extending the VLD
algorithms to strategies based on time-domain features. The ro-
bustness of the tandem approach should also be verified on a
larger database to better establish its performance under realis-
tic application conditions.
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